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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO SUPERIOR'S ASSERTION, THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL 
COURT FROM GRANTING SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
A. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE AMOUNT OF THE 
PRINCIPAL CHARGE BY INTERWEST ANESTHESIA. HOWEVER 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO HOW MUCH, 
IF ANY MR. PETT STILL OWE INTERWEST FOR THE ANESTHESIA 
SERVICES PROVIDED BY INTERWEST. 
Although there is no dispute that Interwest initially charged $572.00 for anesthesia 
services it provided on behalf of Mr. Pett's daughter, there is a genuine issue of fact as to 
how much of that original billing, if any, is still owed. That issue of fact is created by 
Superior's own documents. 
On page 7 of its brief Superior admits that its own complaint creates an issue of fact 
as to the amount, if any, Mr. Pert owes or owed for the anesthesia services provided to his 
daughter. On page 7 of its brief Superior states as follows: 
Mr. Pett points to two figures he says stand in contradiction to this amount. In the 
complaint, the itemization of amounts owed listed $627.04 as "unpaid principal." R.5 
Superior then goes on to make the following ridiculous statement: "The complaint was not 
verified, and so is not evidence on which a genuine conflict may be supported." Superior 
obviously has never read, or does not understand, the provisions of 56 URCP with respect to 
motions for summary judgment. 
In pertinent part, URCP 56(c) specifically provides: 
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The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added). 
Contrary to Superior's assertion there is no requirement that a complaint be verified in 
order for its contents to create a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, Superior's own 
pleadings, and its own records, create a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount, if 
any, Mr. Pett owes or owed to Superior, and that genuine issue of material fact precluded the 
trial court from granting Superior's motion for summary judgment. 
Superior attempts to negate this disputation of fact by having its counsel testify. On 
page 8 of its memorandum Superior states as follows: 
In preparing this brief counsel noticed that the judgment incorrectly carried forward 
the extra $55.04 in principle. Superior stipulates to correction of the judgment so the 
principal is reduced to $527.00. With corresponding reduction in interest and the 
total judgment.l 
Not only is Superior's counsel impermissibly testifying in Superior's appeal brief, 
Superior and its counsel are impermissibly attempting to change the record ex post facto on 
appeal. 
Superior and its counsel's attempt to change the record ex post facto is not 
permissible, and does not change the fact that Superior's own documents evidence a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the amount, if any, Mr. Pett owes, or owed, to Interwest. 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. 
1. Thus Superior admits that the judgment entered by the trial court is incorrect, invalid and must 
be vacated. 
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Furthermore, Superior does not even attempt to explain or rationalize the fact that 
Exhibit A, attached to the affidavit of Windy Gittins, Superior filed in support of its motion 
for summary judgment, claims that only $317.57 was allegedly transferred to Superior for 
collection. (Record at 34). 
Superior cannot have it all three ways. Superior cannot claim that Gittins affidavit 
established as a matter of undisputed fact that $572.00 is the amount of Mr. Petfs alleged 
obligation to Interwest, (Record at 30), next claims that its complaint establishes as a matter 
of fact that the undisputed amount of Mr. Petfs alleged obligation to it is $627.04, allegedly 
representing the "Unpaid Principal, " (Record at 6), and then also claim that Exhibit A, 
attached to the of Gittins, establishes as an undisputed matter of fact that the amount Mr. Pett 
allegedly owes Superior is $317.57. (Record at 34). 
Because Superior has alleged in its own documents that Mr. Pett owes three different 
amounts, for the anesthesia service provided on his behalf, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett owes Superior or anyone else for any 
anesthesia services provided on his behalf. Ergo, Superior's assertion that it is undisputed 
that the principal balance Mr. Pett allegedly owed to Superior or anyone else at the time 
Superior filed its motion for summary judgment is in fact $572.00 is not undisputed that 
Superior falsely claims. 
B. THE FACT THAT $317.57 WAS ALLEGEDLY ADDED TO ANY ALLEGED 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE OWED BY MR PETT TO SUPERIOR OR 
ANYONE ELSE AS A COLLECTION CHARGE IS SPECIFICALLY 
DISPUTED BY SUPERIORS OWN DOCUMENTS. 
Once again, Superior's own documents are contradictory. While Gittins affidavit may 
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very well claim a collection charge was added to Mr. Pett's account in the amount of 
$317.57, prior to the time Interwest referred Mr. Pett's account to Superior, and though 
Gittins may also testify that the principal amount owed by Mr. Pett was $572.00, Exhibit A, 
attached to her affidavit, clearly and unequivocally states that $317.57 was transferred to 
Superior for collection $572.00, not $635.14 and not $952.71.2 Therefore, Superior's own 
documents created issue of fact as to what the $317.57 was for as well as the amount of Mr. 
Pett's alleged debt to Interwest, that Interwest allegedly transferred to Superior for collection. 
Superiors counsel again attempts to testify and give his interpretation of what the 
various entries contained on Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit mean or indicate. However, once 
again, it is inappropriate for Superior's counsel to testify on appeal as to what he thinks the 
entries may or may not mean, when there is nothing in the record indicating what these 
entries all are. 
C. CONTRARY TO SUPERIORS ASSERTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE 
ALTIUS PAYMENT WAS RESCINDED BY ALTIUS IS SPECIFICALLY 
AND STRENUOUSLY DISPUTED. 
Contrary to Superior's assertion, there is a strenuous dispute as to whether or not the 
Altius payment to Interwest was rescinded by Altius. 
In Point C of its brief, Superior makes the following statement: 
Superior supplied evidence that Mr. Pett's insurer, Altius made a payment to 
Interwest of $334.62 on July 12, 2004. There was also direct testimony as well as a 
business record, evidence Interwest fs refund of the $334.62 to Altius with the 
The $317 57 is the last entry on Exhibit A, and it specifically states that $317.57 was the amount of 
Mr. Pett's alleged debt that was transferred to Superior for collection. 
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consequent reversal of the previous credit. (Emphasis added). (Superior's brief, page 
9, 1 2). 
Those assertions are simply not true. 
Gittins affidavit is not direct testimony evidencing that either Altius made a payment 
to Interwest of $334.62 on July 12, 2004 or of "Interwest's refund of the $334.62 to Altius."3 
Gittins does not claim to have personal knowledge of any payments made by Altius to 
Interwest. Therefore, any assertions in her affidavit are not based on personal knowledge 
and are not direct testimony as Superior falsely claims.4 
Furthermore, as established in Mr. Pett's Opening Brief, Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit 
is not a business record, as Superior falsely claims, but rather it is simply a document created 
3 
In it's memorandum to the trial court, Superior first claimed that Altius simply took the alleged 
payment out of Interwest's account. In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment Superior states: 
On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a payment, in the 
amount of $334.62 to Interwest Anesthesia. (Record at 24, \ 9). 
However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31. 2005. because on or about February 25. 
2005. Altius paid the Defendant $514.80. to pay for the services and supplies provided by 
Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. (Emphasis 
added). (Record at 24, U 10). 
Then, Superior claimed Altius offset the amount of the alleged payment against moneys owed 
Interwest for services provided to a different insured. In its reply memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, Superior makes the following ludicrous statement: "Is it that unusual 
of a concept that if Interwest did not send a refund check to Altius that Altius would of set the 
amount against another account. " (Record at 62). 
At no time, in the trial court, did Superior ever claim that Interwest refunded any money to Altius it 
received for services rendered on behalf of Mr. Pett. 
4 
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and 
review of the Defendant \s account in this matter. I have determined the following" (Record, at 31). 
(Emphasis added). 
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for purpose of litigation. Even the most cursory examination of Exhibit A, termed a 
"Patient Ledger Analysis, " shows that the entries in Exhibit A are not in chronological 
order. The last four entries on page two of Exhibit A are dated 6/10/2004, 7/12/2004, 
9/1/2004, and 10/1/2005. Those entries follow twelve entries in 2005, on page one of 
Exhibit A, ending with the last entry on 9/1/2005. If Exhibit A was a real business record, 
prepared by Interwest at the time the entries allegedly made, and kept in the ordinary course 
of business, as required for document to be admissible as a business record under the Utah 
rules of evidence, the entries on Exhibit A would be in chronological order. The fact that the 
entries are not in chronological order clearly establishes that Exhibit A is a document created 
expressly for purposes of litigation, rather than a document that is prepared and kept in the 
ordinary course of business. Therefore, it is not a business record as defined by 803(6) URE. 
In order for documents to qualify as a business record under the Rule 803 (6) URE 
URE, the proponent of the document must establish that document was: 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it 
was the regular practice of thai business activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12). 
Or a statute permitting certification. 
In the case of the alleged refund to Altius, Gittins does not testify that she has 
personal knowledge that the refund was made, that she personally made the refund, that it 
was her job to supervise any such refunds or that she was present when others made the 
alleged refund. Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit is clearly not a document prepared in the 
course of regular conducted business, because as previously established, the entries on the 
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documents are not in chronological order, clearly establishing that the entries were not made 
at or near the time the entries indicate that they were made and were not made as a part of 
the regular practice of the business, as mandated Rule 803 (6) URE. 
Again, if Exhibit A was a real business record, prepared by Interwest at the time the 
entries allegedly were made and kept in the ordinary course of business, as required for 
document to be admissible as a business record under the Rule 803 (6) URE, Exhibit A 
would be in chronological order, and the fact that the entries are not clearly establishes that 
Exhibit A is a document created expressly for purposes of litigation, rather than a document 
that is prepared and kept in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, it is not a business 
record, and it establishes nothing. 
Furthermore, even assuming that Exhibit A could possibly construed to be a business 
record, it is not properly authenticated under the provisions Rules 911 and 912 URE, as 
mandated by Rule 803(6), and is therefore inadmissible to establish anything under the 
provisions of the URE and could not properly be considered on Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Superior specifically claims that Interwest refunded the alleged payment of $334.62 
Altius paid to Interwest on Mr. Petfs behalf (Superior's brief, page 9. ^ 2), because Altius 
made a direct payment to Mr. Pett in the amount of $514.80. (Record at page 24^ f 10), Mr. 
Pett specifically denied ever receiving any such payment, (Record at 53, ^  13), and Superior 
has not, and cannot, prove that he received any such payment. However, Superior asserts 
that it is Mr. Pett's obligation to prove a negative, i.e., prove that he did not receive the 
payment of $514.80 from Altius. Such assertion is absolute nonsense and contrary to all 
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legal and logical principles. A person cannot prove a negative, and is never required to do 
so. 
Likewise, in its statement of facts of its brief, Superior made a similar ridiculous 
assertion. On page 5 paragraph 2 of its brief Superior states as follows: "Mr. Pett did not 
provide any evidence that Altius did or did not pay $334.62 to Interwest or that Interwest did 
or did not return the $334.60 payment to Altius." Again, Superior is asserting that Mr. Pett 
should be required to prove a negative, i.e., that Altius did not pay $334.62 to Interwest and 
that Interwest did not return the payment of $334.62 to Altius. However, it is again 
Superior's obligation to prove the fact Interwest refunded the payment of $334.62 to 
Interwest, that Altius retracted the payment of the $334.62 or that Altius offset the $336.62 
against money it owed Interwest for service provided by Interwest to another Altius insured. 
It is not Mr. Pett's obligation to prove the negative of those contradictory assertions, i.e., that 
Altius did not retract the payment of the $334.62 or did not offset the $336.62 against 
money it owed Interwest for service provided by Interwest to another Altius insured, which 
he can never do. 
Although in its brief to this Court, Superior claims that it refunded the $334.62 to 
Altius, (Superior's brief, page 9. ^ 2), in his pleadings and memoranda before the trial court, 
Superior claims that Altius simply withdrew the alleged payment of the $334.62 from the 
Interwest account. (Record at Page 24, f^ 10). However when challenged on the assertion 
that Altius could in fact withdrawn any money from Interwest account, much less withdrew 
any money more than a year after Interwest claims the payment was made, Superior made the 
inane assertion that Altius simply offset the $334.62 payment, it made on behalf of Mr. Pett, 
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from money owed to Interwest for service provided to other Altius insured. (Record at page 
63, If 4). But of course, Superior did not provide any documentation, of any nature 
whatsoever, evidencing its inane assertion that Altius offset the $334.62 Interwest received 
for payment on Mr. Pett's behalf from payments due for any other customer, client or account 
of Interwest. It did not do so, and cannot do so, because Altius did not, and could not go into 
any of Interwest accounts and withdraw money. Nor, could Altius legally offset any 
payment made to Interwest on Mr. Pett's behalf against any money, owed Interwest, for 
services provide for, or on behalf of, any other Altius insured for which Altius was obligated 
to make payment to Interwest. Superior's assertion to the contrary is so ridiculous, at best it 
violates the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct's requirement of candor and honesty to the 
court, and is perhaps even a fraud on the court. 
Superior next makes the assertion that because it claims it "refunded" the $334.62 
Altius paid to it on July 31, 2005, and that the reason for the alleged refund is relevant. 
(Superiors brief, page 10, paragraph 1). However, as with many other of Superior's 
assertions, that assertion is both factually and legally incorrect. 
In paragraph 10 of its statement of fact contained in its memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of its motion for summary judgment, Superior makes the following 
assertion: 
10. However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005 because on or about 
February 25, 2005 Aldus paid $514.80 to the defendant pay for the services and 
supplies provided by interest anesthesia to the defendant's daughter on or about May 
2Z Please see the affidavit of Wendy Gittins. (Record at 24). (Emphasis added). 
Because Superior specifically states that Altius "retracted' the payment of $334.62 it 
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made to Interwest on or about July 12, 2004, for the reason that Altius allegedly made a 
payment to Mr. Pett of $514.80 on February 25, 2005, whether or not Altius ever made any 
such payment to Mr. Pett is directly relevant and controlling as to whether or not Altius ever 
"retracted" the $334.62 payment it made to Interwest. 
If Altius never made any payment to Mr. Pett in the amount of $514.80 on February 
25, 2005, as Superior asserts, then it logically follows that Altius did not retract the payment 
of $334.62 it made to Interwest on July 12, 2004 either. According to Superiors bwn 
statement of facts, made in support of its motion for summary judgment, the only reason 
Altius allegedly "retracted" the $334.62 payment to Interwest was because Altius made a 
payment of $514.80 to Mr. Pett on February 25, 2005. 
Superior has not, and cannot, produce any evidence supporting its bogus assertion that 
Altius in fact made a payment to Mr. Pett in the amount of $514.80 on February 25, 2005. 
Because Superior claims that Altius only "retracted" the payment of the $334.62 it made to 
Interwest on July 12, 2004 because Altius paid Mr. Pett $514.80 on February 25, 2005, 
because Superior canndt produce any evidence supporting its assertion that Altius ever paid 
Mr. Pett $514.80 on February 25, 2005, because Superior has not and cannot produce any 
documentation showing that Altius ever "retracted" the payment of $334.62 it made to 
Interwest on July 24, 2004, because Superior has not and cannot provide any evidence 
showing that it ever "refunded" the $334.62 Altius paid it on July 12, 2004, and because 
Superior has not, and cannot, produce any evidence supporting its inane assertion that Altius 
simply offset the payment of the $334.62 against money it owed to Interwest for services 
allegedly provided by Interwest to other Altius ensured, there is a genuine issue of material 
-10-
fact as to whether or not the $334.62 Altius paid to Interwest on July 12, 2004 was ever 
refunded to Altius, retracted by Altius or offset by Altius against monies owed to Interwest 
on behalf of other Altius ensured. 
Because there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not the $334.62 Altius paid to 
Interwest on Mr. Petfs behalf was ever "retracted" by Altius, "refunded" to Altius, or offset 
by Altius, there is a genuine issue of material fact to how much, if any, Mr. Pett owed or 
owes to Interwest. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law and committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. 
POINT II 
SUPERIOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
A. WHETHER OR NOT MR. PETT HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO 
INTERWEST IS IRRELEVANT. HE HAD NO CONTRACTUAL DUTIES 
TO SUPERIOR. 
In subsection A, of Point II of its brief, Superior claims that Mr. Pett owed contractual 
duties to Interwest and that Interwest is a third-party beneficiary to the Consent and 
Conditions of the Treatment between Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett. 
However, in paragraph 2 page 11 of its brief, Superior admits that Mr. Pett was not in privity 
of contract with Interwest. 
Superior then argues that because paragraph 4 the Consent and Conditions of 
Treatment, between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley Specialty Hospital, states: 
/ am aware that the position services by radiologists, cardiologists, anesthesiologist 
as well as medical surgical and emergency care are not billed by the hospital but are 
billed separately. I understand that I am under the same obligation to those providers 
as stated in this agreement in less otherwise agreed to in writing with those providers. 
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/ authorize payment of any medical benefits for such claims to the appropriate 
provider. 
Interwest is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Cache Valley Specialty 
Hospital and Mr. Pett. 
However, whether or not Interwest is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between 
Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett is irrelevant to this case. Superior is not a 
third-party beneficiary to the contract, and it is Superior who has sued Mr. Pett not Interwest. 
Superior did not claim at the trial court level that it was a third-party beneficiary of 
the contract between Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett. Therefore, it cannot 
now raise the issue of whether or not it is in fact a third-party beneficiary of the contract 
between Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett for the first time on appeal. 
We do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal unless specific grounds 
for doing so are presented to this court. Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist v. Spanish Fork 
City, 918 P.2d 870, 880 (Utah 1996) (stating that with few limited exceptions, this 
court will not consider issues raised for first time on appeal); Medical Products Inc. 
v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228 (Utah 1998).5 
B. SUPERIOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT 18%, COURT 
COSTS OR ATTORNEY1 S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH HIS 
IMPROPER LAWSUIT AGAINST MR. PETT. 
Because Superior did not notify Mr. Pett that any claim Interwest allegedly had 
against him had been assigned to Superior, prior to Superior filing lawsuit against Mr. Pett, 
5 
If Interwest had filed suit in its own name, or if Superior had filed suit on behalf of Interwest, then 
perhaps Superior could argue that Mr Pett owed contractual duties to Interwest in connection with 
his lawsuit However, when Mr Pett's alleged debt to Interwest was assigned to Superior and 
Superior opted to sue Mr Pett in its own name rather than on behalf the Interwest, any potential 
contractual obligations Mr Pett may have had to Interwest became nonexistent with respect to 
Superior 
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Superior is estopped to claim it is entitled to a court costs, interest at 18% and/or attorney's 
fees in connection with the improper and unlawful suit against Mr. Pett. 
Superior claims that because The Consent and Conditioned of Treatment contains a 
provision for the payment of interest on any unpaid balance after 60 days, collection costs 
and attorneys fees it is not required to give Mr. Pett notice of either Interwest's claim for the 
services provided on his behalf or notice that any indebtedness for the services had been 
assigned to Superior. That assertion is contrary to both state law and federal law. 
As established in Mr. Pett's opening brief, under the express holding of Webb v. 
BrinkerhoffConstr. Co, 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988), when a debt has been assigned, the party 
to whom the debt has been assigned is required to give the debtor notice of the assignment 
prior to instigating a lawsuit against the debtor. In Webb, the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically held: 
Notification to a debtor of an assignment of the debt is indispensable if the debtor is 
to be held liable to the assignee. If the debt is to be discharged by payment to 
someone other than the creditor because of that assignment, unambiguous 
notification of the change must be given the debtor; 
Superior seeks to limit that holding of Webb to only those cases in which a payment to 
someone other than the assignee has been made, thus relieving the debtor from the obligation 
of double payments. However, Webb is not so limited. Webb does not state that notice of 
assignment is only required if the debtor has already made payment to someone other than 
the assignee. Webb requires that notice of assignment must be given to a debtor before an 
assignee seeks to enforce any debt against a debtor. 
Furthermore, because Superior is a collection agency, it is governed by the provisions 
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of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Section 809 of that Act, 15 USC 1692g, mandates 
that any person or entity covered under the provisions of The Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act not only provide a debtor notice that alleged debt has been assigned to the person or 
entity for collection, but also within five days of the initial contact with the debtor, that the 
debt collector must provided debtor with information showing: 1) the amount of the alleged 
debt; 2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is allegedly owed; 3) a statement that 
unless the debtor disputes the validity of the debt, within 30 days, it will be assumed to be 
valid; 4) a statement that if the debtor notifies the debt collector in writing, within 30 days, 
that the debt or any portion of it is disputed the debt collector will obtain verification of the 
debt and mail a copy of the verification to the debtor; and 5) a statement that upon the 
debtor's written request, the debt collector will provide the debtor name and address of the 
original creditor if different from the current creditor. 
Although Superior claims that Interwest sent Mr. Pett notices of the amount debt he 
allegedly owed for services provided on his behalf, Superior did not attach any such notices 
to its complaint, its memorandum in support of its motion for judgment or to reply 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. Nor did Superior attach any 
notices it allegedly sent Mr. Pett informing him of the assignment of the alleged debt to 
Superior from Interwest, as required bu Wev and under the express provisions of Section 809 
of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692g. 
Mr. Pett stated in his Affidavit that he never received any bills or notices from either 
Interwest or Superior, prior to Superior serving him with a summons and complaint in this 
matter. (Record at 53, ]fs 10-11). If in fact either Interwest or Superior had sent Mr. Pett any 
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notices of his alleged debt to Interwest or its assignment to Superior, it should have been a 
simple matter to attach those notices, or a least one of those notices, not only to the 
complaint, but also to Superior's memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment. And surely if those notices existed, Superior would have attached at least one of 
those notices to its reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, after 
it received Mr. Pett's Affidavit stating that he had never received any such notices from either 
Interwest or Superior. 
The fact that neither Superior nor Interwest have produced any documentation, of any 
nature whatsoever, showing that Mr. Pett was ever aware of any alleged obligation to 
Interwest prior to his receipt of the summons and complaint in this matter creates a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether any such notices were ever sent and precluded the trial 
court from entering summary judgment in favor of Superior as well as awarding Superior 
court costs, attorneys fees and interest at 18%. 
Because Superior cannot produce any evidence, of any nature whatsoever, 
establishing that it ever notified Mr. Pett that his alleged obligation to Interwest had been 
assigned to Superior for collection, under both state and federal law, Superior is not entitled 
to attorney's fees, collection costs or interest at 18% in connection with its unlawful and 
improper suit against Mr. Pett. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND 
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT 
WEIGHED THE FACTS ON SUPERIORS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In response to Mr. Pett's assertion that the trial court committed reversible and 
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prejudicial error when it weighed the facts on Superior's motion for summary judgment, 
Superior simply states that trial court did not weigh the evidence. Superior does not even 
attempt to address the ridiculous and illogical statements of the trial court contained in its 
December 28, 2006 memorandum decision. 
Superior has not done so, and is not attempted to do so, because the various 
statements of the trial court, set forth in Mr. Pett's opening brief, demonstrate such a blatant 
weighing of the facts that any attempt to construe the trial court statements as something 
other than impermissible of an unlawful weighing of the facts is impossible. 
Because it is impossible to read the trial court's December 28, 2006 memorandum 
decision and concluded that the trial court did anytihdng other then engage in impermissible 
and unlawful weighing of the facts, Superior was not entitled to summary judgment. 
Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Superior. 
R THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND 
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT 
VIEWED THE ALLEGED EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO SUPERIOR. 
In response to Mr. Pett's assertion that the trial court committed reversible and 
prejudicial error when it viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Superior when 
ruling on Superior's motion for summary judgment, Superior, again, does not even attempt to 
rebut that assertion. And once again, Superior does not even attempt to address the 
ridiculous and illogical statements of the trial court contained in its December 28, 2006 
memorandum decision, or dispute, in any logical or meaningful way, that the trial court 
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viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Superior. As with Mr. Pett's assertion that 
rite trial court improperly and unlawfully weighed the evidence on Superior's summary 
judgment motion, Superior has not done so, and is not attempted to do so, because the 
various statements of the trial court, set forth in Mr. Pett's opening brief, demonstrate beyond 
any doubt that the trial court impermissibly viewed all facts in the light most favorable to 
Superior, and it is impossible for any logical, rational person to conclude the trial did 
anything otherwise. 
Because it is impossible to read the trial court's December 28, 2006 memorandum 
decision and concluded that the trial court did anything other than view the facts in the light 
most favorable to Superior, Superior was not entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, this 
Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
POINT ITT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
WENDY GITTINS AND THEN RELIED ON HER AFFIDAVIT IN RULING ON 
SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56(e) 
URCp. Therefore, the trial court was required to strike it, and not rely on it, when ruling on 
Superior's morion for summary judgment. 
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that "[supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. "Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, t> & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 
421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d693, 695 
(Utah Ct.App 1989); so an affidavit which does not meet the requirements of rule 
56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 
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P. 2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blomquist, 504 P. 2d at 1020-21 (an affidavit 
containing statements made only "on information and beliefr is insufficient and will 
be disregarded). (Emphasis added). 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 1990), see also. GNS Partnership v. 
Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App. 1994). 
Affidavits submitted in support or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by 
the trial court if largely based on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs. 
See Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) ("Under [rule] 56(e), an • 
affidavit [based] on information and belief is insufficient to provoke a genuine issue 
of fact."); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) ("[Statements in [an] 
affidavit [that] are largely conclusory. . . would not be admissible in evidence and 
may not be considered on summary judgment."); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Rec. 
Corp., 29 Utah 2d274, 508 P.2d538, 542 (1973) ("Statements made merely on 
information and belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would 
not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an 
affidavit."). 
136 P.3d 1252; Brown v. Jorgensen; 2006 UT App. 168 (Emphasis added). 
Superior claims that Mr. Pett's motion to strike the affidavit of Gittins was tflate and 
inappropriate." Superior also claims that liunder rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a motion to strike is made before responding to a pleading. " Superior further claims that 
Mr. Pett's motion to strike the affidavit of Gittins came two weeks after his response to 
Superior's motion for summary judgment and, therefore, was untimely under the rules. 
Superior's memorandum, page 16, paragraph 3. 
Superior's assertion that Mr. Pert was required to file a motion to strike Gittins 
affidavit prior to filing a response to Superior's motion for summary judgment is either a 
deliberate misrepresentation of a law, on the part of Superior, or evidence of Superior's total 
lack of understanding of law with respect to motions to strike affidavits. 
Motions to strike affidavits are governed by Rule 56 URCP, not Rule 12 URCP. 
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Superior has not, and cannot, identify any of part of Rule 12 that states a motion to strike an 
affidavit must be filed before party responds to motion for summary judgment. Likewise, 
Superior has not, and cannot, site this court to any case law which holds the motion to strike 
an affidavit must be made before a response is filed to motion for summary judgment. There 
is simply no such requirement under Utah law. 
Superior also claims that Gittins affidavit was based on personal knowledge and 
"demonstrated the reliability of the business records which were attached among which the 
testimony focused" That assertion is utter nonsense. 
As previously established in this brief, Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit not only cannot 
qualify as a business record, it is obviously a document that was created solely for the 
purposes of this litigation. Therefore, the trial court was specifically prohibited from relying 
on it or considering it, in any manner whatsoever, when ruling on Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, GNS Partnership v. Fullmer and 
Brown v. Jorgensen supra. 
Additionally, Gitten's own affidavit establishes that the affidavit is not based on 
personal knowledge. In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my 
personal knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant (s account in this matter. I have 
determined the following" (Record, at 31). (Emphasis added). By making the statement "I 
have determined the following" Gittins is unequivocally stating that everything in her 
affidavit after paragraph 3 is something that she has simply determined, not that she knows, 
i^ot that she may remember, or even something that she believes, but something that she has 
determined. Rule 56 does not permit affidavits to be based on a person s opinion, 
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conclusions or determinations. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, GNS Partnership v. 
Fullmer and Brown v. Jorgensen supra. 
Because Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56 
URCP, as a matter of law, the trial court was required to strike it. The affidavit was also 
based on inadmissible hearsay and a document that was prepared solely for purposes of this 
litigation and could not possibly be construed to be any sort of business record; therefore, the 
trial court was required to strike it. 
Because the trial court failed and refused to strike Gittins affidavit, and then relied on 
her affidavit when ruling on Superior's motion for summary judgment, it erred as a matter of 
law and committed prejudicial and reversible error when ruling on Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court must reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
POINT IV 
SUPERIOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR OPPOSING MR. 
PETTS APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPROPER AND UNLAWFUL 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SUPERIOR. 
In Point IV of its brief, Superior asserts that it is entitled to attorney's fees in 
conjunction with his opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal of the trial court's improper and unlawful 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Superior. Superior asserts that, because the trial 
court awarded it attorney's fees in conjunction with his motion for summary judgment, it 
should be awarded attorney's fees in this appellate proceeding. Superior further asserts that it 
is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision, presumably The Consent and 
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Conditions of Treatment. Superior's assertions are incorrect, both factually and legally. 
First, The Consent and Conditions of Treatment is not a contractual agreement 
between Mr. Pett and Superior, as Superior has admitted.6 Thus, Superior is not entitled to 
an award of attorney fees pursuant to the terms of The Consent and Conditions of Treatment, 
because if Interwest was not in privity of contract, as Superior has admitted, then Superior 
who is allegedly Interwest's assignee cannot be in privity of contract with Mr. Pett either. 
Additionally, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Superior's motion 
for summary judgment and awarded Superior attorney's fees in conjunction with that 
summary judgment motion. As previously established in this Brief, Superior violated both 
state and federal law when it initiated this lawsuit against Mr. Pett, without first notifying 
him of any assignment from Interwest to Superior. 
Because Superior violated both state and federal law when it initiated this lawsuit 
against Mr. Pett, without first notifying him of any assignment from Interwest to Superior, 
Superior was not entitled to summary judgment, at the trial court level, or to any award of 
attorneys fees at the trial court level, and, therefore, it is not entitled to any attorney's fees 
associated with his opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal of the trial court's unlawful and improper 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior to this Court. 
Because Superior did not comply with either the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the 
jUtah Rules of Evidence, when it filed its motion for summary judgment, its motion for 
summary judgment was a violation of Rule 11 URCP and UCA 78-27-56. Therefore, the 
6
. "Mr. Pett was not in privity of contract wit InterWest. " Superior's brief, page 11 ,<[[ 3. 
-21-
trial court could not possibly logically or legally grant Superior's motion for summary 
judgment, and Superior was not entitled to any attorney's fees at the trial court level. 
Consequently, Superior is not entitled to any attorney's fees on appeal. 
Mr. Pett, however, should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees on appeal, pursuant 
to the provisions of Rule 40 URAP, because Superior's opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal is 
frivolous, disingenuous, spurious, and without any basis in fact or law. 
Superior's initial failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 56 URCP when it filed 
its motion for summary judgment, i.e., basing its motion for summary judgment on hearsay 
documents, that it falsely asserted were business records, failing to include certified copies of 
all documents on which it relied in the summary judgment motion, falsely claiming that a 
document it prepared solely for this litigation was in fact a business record, submitting an 
affidavit based on speculation conclusion and opinion, and falsely asserting claims which it 
could not prove, and did not even attempt to prove, was a per se violation of Rule 11 URCP 
as well as UCA 78-27-56. 
Superior's continued representation to this Court that it's failure to comply with the 
provisions of Rule 56 URCP when it filed its motion for summary judgment, i.e., basing its 
motion for summary judgment on hearsay documents, that it falsely asserted were business 
records, failing to include certified copies of all documents on which it relied in the summary 
judgment motion, falsely claiming that a document it prepared solely for this litigation was in 
fact a business record, submitting an affidavit based on speculation conclusion and opinion, 
and falsely asserting claims which it could not prove, and did not even attempt to prove, is 
justified and proper, is a per se violation of Rule 40 URAP. Therefore, pursuant to the 
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provisions of Rule 40 URAP, Mr. Pett should be awarded his costs and fees associated with 
prosecuting this appeal. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. The trial court erred, as a 
matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it weighed disputed facts 
in this case. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the light most favorable to 
Superior. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it failed to strike the affidavit of Gittins. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, 
and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it awarded court costs, interest at 18% 
and attorney's fees to Superior. 
Because the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment, when it weighed 
disputed facts in this case, when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the light most 
favorable to Superior, and when it awarded court costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees to 
Superior, this Court must, as a matter of law, reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Superior. Therefore, Mr. Pett respectfully requests that this Court issue 
an order reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior and 
demand this matter back to the district court for further proceedings. Mr. Pett also resquests 
that this Court award him his cost and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal 
-23-
because Superior's opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal is a pers se violation of Rule 40 URAP, as 
well as UCA §78-27-56. 
Respectfully submitted this / ^ day of February 2008. 
- - > /i 
%^^^^^^^C-
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
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Sec. 1692g. Validation of debts 
(a) Notice of debt; contents 
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumerin connection with the 
collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in 
the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written 
notice containing -
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days 
after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, 
or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by 
the debt collector; 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt 
collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, 
or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will 
obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against 
the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be 
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request 
within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the 
consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if 
different from the current creditor. 
(b) Disputed debtslf the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the 
thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion 
thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original 
creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, 
until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name 
and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name 
and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. 
(c) Admission of liability 
The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be 
construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
Section applicable only with respect to debts for which the initial attempt to collect occurs 
after the effective date of this subchapter, which takes effect upon the expiration of six 
months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 818 of Pub. L. 90-321, set out as a note under 
section 1692 of this title. 
Last modified: June 14, 2006 
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after the effective date of this subchapter, which takes effect upon the expiration of six 
months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 818 of Pub. L. 90-321, set out as a note under 
section 1692 of this title. 
Last modified: June 14, 2006 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if 
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of 
Subsection (1). 
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Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; 
sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one 
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an 
attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and 
telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, 
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be 
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the 
attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the 
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines 
that subdivision (bj has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated 
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from 
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or 
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period 
as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or 
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the 
party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in 
presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held 
jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
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(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing 
the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law 
firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be 
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the 
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order 
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other 
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation 
of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court 
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made 
by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(c)(2)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined 
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the 
provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall 
serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete 
within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete 
outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer 
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty 
days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a 
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding 
to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served 
within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if 
one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion 
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a 
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, 
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for-summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not 
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion 
by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, 
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) 
of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
-5-
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is 
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the 
party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion 
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the 
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as 
the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no 
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days 
after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other 
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does 
not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by 
motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this ade. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or 
by answei or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided m Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any 
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this 
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish 
security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and 
determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to 
file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges 
as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, 
instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 
30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order 
dismissing the action. 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment 
as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of 
the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted 
accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but 
the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
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the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order 
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 
be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the 
party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active 
member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign his or her 
individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar 
number. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other 
paper and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need not be verified 
or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or 
her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or 
interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is 
not signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the 
omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of the court provided by 
Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, after reasonable notice 
and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, take 
appropriate action against any attorney or person who practices before it for inadequate 
representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to 
appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any 
action to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Office of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair 
the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before the 
bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this state, 
may appear, pro hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration. 
A separate motion is not required in the appellate court if the attorney has previously been 
admitted pro hac vice in the lower tribunal, but the attorney shall file in the appellate court a 
notice of appearance pro hac vice to that effect. 
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Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as 
a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made 
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Exciled utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, 
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or 
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof 
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness 
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully 
and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh 
in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum 
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered 
by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, .or data compilation, 
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or 
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make 
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in 
this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
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— .. ~.,c . m u i i i u i a Associates 
274 N Main St 
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA 
Patient Ledger Analysis 
YMC tf'iSl 
Active Charges Only 
PETT 
Init. Bal: $ 0.00 
HEATHER 
Ins. Bal: $ 0.00 
Patient#: 20,644 Date of Birth: 9/16/1993 Phone: (435)512-1821 
Pat. Bal: $ 952.71 Total Bal: $952.71 SSN: 
Charge Seq. #: 66,006 Primary: ALTIUS ALTIUS 
Charge Amount: $ 572.00 P. Status:* Resolved S. Status: 
tem# From To POS CPT# Procedure Description 
Secondary: 
Attending Physician: JRR Trans. Date: 5/27/200 
Mod ICD# Charges Days or Units 
Charge Balance: $635.14 
Vans. Date5/27/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 66006 Source: Charges 
5/27/2004 5/27/2004 22 00170 INTRAORAL PROCEDURES PI 474.10 
i rans. Date:11/1/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 107253 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
>ans. Date:12/l/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 115577 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
rans. Date:l/l/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 123499 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
"rans. Date2/l/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 133259 Item ± -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
tans. DateS/1/2005 Trans. Seq. 4: 141287 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
-ans. Date:4/l/2005 Trans. Seq. ?: 150429 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
mterest 
ans. Datef/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 159975 Item ± -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
nterest 
ans. Date:6/l/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 169446 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
iterest 













ms. Date:7/28/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 186218 Item #: 1 Source: Payment - PATIENT PRI INS Amt: 
LTIUS PAID YOU $514.80 ON 2/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL IS DUE IMMEDIATELY. ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE 










ns. Date:7/31/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 187320 item #: 1 Source: Payment - UNITED UNITED2 R 
31/05 REFUND ALTIUS CK 5254 
Amt: $334.62 
is. DateS/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 188026 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
erest 
FINANCE Amt: $9.42 
is. Date9/l/2005 Trans. Seq. rf: 195723 
E-COLLECT LETTER SENT 
Source: PC Amt: 
s. DateS/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 195906 Item #: -I Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Test 
FINANCE Amt: $9.56 
11/1/2005 
IT 
nit. Bal: S 0.00 
HEATHER 
Ins. Bal: $ 0.00 
Trans. Datetf/10/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 67551 
Primary Generated. OutputType: PRINTED 
Trans. Date:7/12/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 77896 
ALTIUS PAYMENTS 6602981 
Trans. DateS/1/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 89602 
Interest 
Trans. Daterl 0/1/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 99069 
Interest 
InterWest Anesthesia Associates 
274 N Main St 
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA 
Patient Ledger Analytic 
Active Charges Only 
pful^rT0'644 D a c e o f 3 inh : 9/16/1993 Phone- (435)512 i « , 
Pat. Bal: £952.71 Total Bal: $952.71 SSN: t^5> 512-1821 
Source: 1st Carrier Claim Generated: ALTIl Amt: 
Item ft 1 Source: Payment-ALTIUS ALTIUS PRI INS Amt: 
Item ft .1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT FINANCE Amt: 




Charge Seq. #: 212,619 Primary: 
Charge Amount: $ 317.57 P. Status: 
Item# From Jo POS CPT# 
S. Status: 
Procedure Description 
Charge Balance: S317.57 
Trans. Daterl 1/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 212619 Source: Charges 
11/1/2005 11/1/2005 22 COLL ACCOUNT TO COLLECTIONS 
Secondary: 
Attending Physician: JRR 
Mod ICD# 
Trans. Date 11/1/200 
Charges Days or Units 
Amt: $317.57 
$317.57 1.00 
